Estimating Hypothetical Bias in Economically Emergent Africa: A Generic Public Good Experiment by Caplan, Arthur J. et al.
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 39/2 (April 2010) 344–358 
Copyright 2010 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 
Estimating Hypothetical Bias in 
Economically Emergent Africa: A Generic 
Public Good Experiment 
 
Arthur J. Caplan, David Aadland, and Anthony Macharia 
 
  This paper reports results from a contingent valuation based public good experiment con-
ducted in the African nation of Botswana. In a sample of university students, we find evidence 
that stated willingness to contribute to a public good in a hypothetical setting is higher than 
actual contribution levels. However, results from regression analysis suggest that this is true 
only in the second round of the experiment, when participants making actual contributions 
have learned to significantly lower their contribution levels. As globalization expands markets, 
and economies such as Botswana’s continue to modernize, there is a growing need to under-
stand how hypothetical bias will influence the valuation of public goods. 
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Experimental studies of bargaining behavior and 
public good provision have recently been extended 
to international and cross-cultural settings. For 
example, Roth et al. (1991) find that latent cultural 
differences partially explain observed variation in 
two-player ultimatum bargaining games, but not in 
multi-player market behavior. Henrich (2000) finds 
a similar cultural effect for ultimatum bargaining 
between a sample of U.S. graduate students and 
Machiguenga tribesmen in the Peruvian Amazon.
1 
In a more recent paper, Ehmke, Lusk, and List 
(2008) find that hypothetical bias in contingent 
valuation (CV) differs across location and cultures. 
  Taken together, these experimental studies sug-
gest that cultural differences can help explain 
variation in behavior associated with standard bar-
gaining and public good valuation frameworks.
2 
The current paper adds to this experimental litera-
ture by providing a preliminary test for hypotheti-
cal bias in the provision of public goods in eco-
nomically emergent Africa.
3,4 In this way, our   
                                                                                    
1 Henrich et al. (2001) expand the scope of these findings to 15 small-
scale societies in 12 countries on five continents. 
2 To the contrary, Slonim and Roth (1998) and Cameron (1999) find 
little or no evidence of a cultural effect on ultimatum bargaining be-
havior. Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) provide an exhaustive survey of 
field experiments conducted in the developing world. The experiments 
focus on individual preferences in four general categories: (i) propen-
sity to cooperate in social dilemmas, (ii) trust and reciprocity, (iii) norms 
of fairness and altruism, and (iv) risk and time preference. They con-
clude that cooperation does in fact exist in category (i). Macroeco-
nomic conditions impact categories (ii) and (iii). With respect to cate-
gory (iv), people in developing countries are not necessarily more risk 
averse, yet impatience results are mixed.  
3 Hypothetical bias is any deviation of an individual’s stated willing-
ness to pay (WTP) from his actual WTP due to the hypothetical nature 
of the good or payment mechanism. Positive (negative) hypothetical 
bias occurs when stated willingness to contribute is higher (lower) than 
the actual contribution level. Note that we are careful not to substitute 
“true willingness to contribute” for “actual contribution level” here, as 
our econometric model’s link with random utility theory (see the Eco- 
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study adds to the accumulating body of knowl-
edge about how to test for the effects of different 
cultural or national identities on economic behav-
ior. As globalization expands markets, and eco-
nomies such as Botswana’s continue to modern-
ize, there is a growing need to understand how 
cultural factors influence the subjective valuation 
of public goods. 
  In contrast to Ehmke, Lusk, and List’s (2008) 
result of negative hypothetical bias for university 
students in Niger, we find evidence of positive hy-
pothetical bias in our sample of university students 
in Botswana. In other words, we find evidence that 
stated willingness to invest in a public good in a 
hypothetical setting is higher than actual invest-
ment levels. However, results from our analyses 
suggest that this is true only in the second round of 
the experiment, when participants making actual 
contributions have learned to significantly lower 
their investment levels. These preliminary results 
suggest that further research regarding the valua-
tion of public goods should target a broader, more 
representative sample of Botswana’s citizens.
5 
  The contrasts between Ehmke, Lusk, and List 
(2008) and this paper also extend to the experi-
mental designs and empirical methodologies. Ehm-
ke, Lusk, and List use a within-subject design, 
                                                                                                                     
nometric Model section for more detail) assumes truth itself is prob-
abilistic [as Harrison (2006) succinctly puts it, what matters is not truth 
per se, but rather a well-established empirical point of reference]. Fur-
ther, we acknowledge that reality is context-specific, i.e., dependent 
upon the social context within which an individual formulates his 
valuation of the good (Harrison and List 2004, List et al. 2004, Huck 
and Weizäcker 2002, List 2006, List 2003, and Lusk and Norwood, 
forthcoming). 
4 We say “preliminary” in order to emphasize the fact that, similar to 
the vast majority of laboratory studies in the literature, our sample is 
restricted to a relatively small group of university students (a restric-
tion necessitated by the high cost associated with running public good 
experiments such as ours). Thus, the existence of hypothetical bias 
among older and less-educated generations of today remains an open 
research question. Although a plethora of WTP estimates exist for pub-
lic goods in developing nations (e.g., see Pearce, Pearce, and Palmer 
2002), none that we are aware of, other than Ehmke, Lusk, and List 
(2008), explicitly address the issue of hypothetical bias. See Murphy et 
al. (2005) for a meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in stated-preference 
valuation. 
5 Although exceptions exist (e.g., Carson et al. 1996, Johannesson 
1997, Smith and Mansfield 1998, Champ and Bishop 2001, Vossler 
and Kerkvliet 2003, Johnston 2006, Haab, Huang, and Whitehead 
1999, and Smith 1999), our finding of positive hypothetical bias is 
consistent with the majority of experiments and field surveys in the 
literature (e.g., List and Gallet 2001, Little and Berrens 2004, Murphy 
and Stevens 2004, Murphy et al. 2005, Harrison 2006, Harrison and 
List 2004, Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström 1995, and Harrison and 
Rutström 2006). Our results are also consistent with the fact that the 
relevant effects are often not found until a few rounds of the experi-
ment have been completed (Ledyard 1995). 
where all 60 participants are confronted with a 
hypothetical public good choice in the first round 
of the experiment and then the same participants 
are confronted with an actual choice in the second 
round of the experiment. As a result, the authors 
cannot be sure whether the valuation differences 
are due to between-round learning or hypothetical 
versus actual incentives. 
  Also, Ehmke, Lust, and List choose a multino-
mial logit model, where the dependent variable 
represents four potential categories of responses 
(yes-yes, no-no, yes-no, and no-yes) to a non-ran-
domized bid for the hypothetical and actual sce-
narios, respectively. Using this type of model, the 
authors are able to establish the existence of 
hypothetical bias as well as identify regional ef-
fects (i.e., whether there are statistical differences 
in participation across the locations: Indiana/Kan-
sas in the United States, China, Niger, and France). 
However, by not having randomized the bid 
values within each region, the authors are pre-
cluded from estimating the magnitude of within-
region hypothetical bias.
6 
  In this study we use a between-subject design, 
where our sample of 100 participants is first di-
vided into hypothetical and actual sub-samples, 
and then each sub-sample participates in two 
separate rounds of the experiment (the next sec-
tion provides a detailed description of the ex-
perimental design). As a result, we are able to iso-
late the effect of between-round learning from the 
effect of hypothetical bias. 
  We estimate a bivariate probit model to account 
for possible error correlation between the respon-
dent’s first- and second-round investment deci-
sions and find evidence of hypothetical bias in the 
second round of the experiment. Then, using two 
separate univariate probit models, we test for 
symmetry in the between-round learning effect, 
and find that individuals making actual invest-
ments are more likely to switch from having said 
“yes” to their (randomized) bid in round one to 
saying “no” in round two. In other words, only 
individuals in the actual treatment learn that free-
                                                                                    
6 Ehmke, Lusk, and List (2008) also test whether culture affects hy-
pothetical bias using a reduced-form binary logit model, where the 
dependent variable takes the value of one if the respondent exhibits 
either positive or negative hypothetical bias (i.e., votes either yes-no or 
no-yes, respectively) and the value of zero if the person exhibits no 
hypothetical bias (i.e., votes either yes-yes or no-no). They find that the 
individuals from more “masculine” and “individualistic” societies are 





  In the next section, we discuss the experimental 
design used in this study to test for hypothetical 
bias. In the section “Data and Unconditional 
Tests” we discuss both our sample frame and the 
data obtained from the public good experiment. 
This section also provides summary statistics and 
unconditional tests for the presence of hypotheti-
cal bias and between-round learning effects in our 
sample. Our empirical model is presented in the 
“Econometric Model” section, followed by a re-
sults section. We conclude with a discussion of 




As alluded to in the previous section, a primary 
objective of the experiment is to create a labora-
tory to test for the magnitude of hypothetical bias 
in the valuation of a public good. To accomplish 
this objective, we incorporate several features 
into the experiment.
8 
  First, we elicit values for a “generic” public 
good that is less prone to “homegrown” assess-
ments by the participants and less affected by the 
existence of field substitutes. Homegrown values 
are infused into the experiment by participants 
from their prior experiences valuing similar pub-
lic goods (i.e., field substitutes), which are inde-
pendent from the induced values provided by the 
experimenter (Harrison 2006, Cummings, Harri-
son, and Rutström 1995, Smith 1976). In this 
way, we lessen the chance that our measure of 
hypothetical bias is confounded by social deter-
minants of the good’s value. For example, if we 
had instead selected “expanded wilderness pro-
tection in the Kalahari Desert” or “private fund-
ing for secondary education” as the public good 
for which values were to be elicited, social pres-
sures such as the “purchase of moral satisfaction” 
(Kahneman and Knetsch 1992) and the “desire to 
conform socially” (Bernheim 1994) would have 
been likely to confound our estimates of hypo-
thetical bias.
9 Further, our goal was to maintain as 
many traditional features of public good experi-
                                                                                    
7 It may in fact be more correct to end this sentence with “….learn 
that more free-riding pays.” The fact that at least some participants in 
each treatment answer “no” to their bid amounts indicates that free-
riding potentially exists in each treatment. 
8 The complete experimental design is provided in the Appendix. 
9 Expanded wilderness protection in the Central Kalahari Desert and 
private funding of secondary school education are two popular issues  
in Botswana at the moment. Ehmke, Lusk, and List (2008) use bottled 
ments as possible, such as induced valuation and 
the incentive to free-ride. This is perhaps best ac-
complished by eliciting values for a more generic 
public good. 
  Second, we wish to create a scenario that 
closely mimics how CV surveys have tradition-
ally been conducted in the field.
10 This entails 
elicitation of maximum willingness to pay (WTP) 
for a public good without the imposition of a pro-
vision-point mechanism, or what Carson and 
Groves (2007) call a “coercive payment” scheme. 
A provision-point mechanism typically sets a 
minimum positive aggregate contribution thresh-
old necessary for provision of the public good 
(Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe 1999). The main ad-
vantage of this type of mechanism is its incentive-
compatibility (Carson and Groves 2007, Cum-
mings et al. 1997). However, in cases where a re-
alistic provision point is unknown, which seems 
to be the predominant case in the CV literature, 
imposition of such a mechanism is unrealistic. 
We therefore use a dichotomous-choice donation 
mechanism so that a minimum positive aggregate 
contribution threshold is not arbitrarily set prior 
to eliciting the participants’ WTP values.
11 
                                                                                    
mineral water as their public good because it is available and con-
sumed in each country included in their sample and therefore less 
likely to induce social pressures. Of course, as Harrison and List 
(2004) point out, lab experiments, no matter how “sterile,” are never 
completely free of context. 
10 We acknowledge that there are well-known limits to how well a 
hypothetical treatment in a laboratory experiment can mimic CV sur-
veys. For example, Cummings and Harrison (1994) point out that there 
is no empirical evidence to suggest that laboratory experiments and CV 
surveys produce similar results [although Carson and Groves (2007) 
cite more recent studies that find similarities between CV surveys and 
experiments]. Carson and Groves (2007) point out that the context 
within which values are elicited in CV surveys—in particular the de-
gree of consequentiality as perceived by respondents—is an important 
determinant of whether the values are incentive-compatible [Landry 
and List (2007) find empirical evidence from a field experiment to 
support this claim]. On the other hand, CV surveys run the risk of pre-
senting respondents with goods and prices that may be perceived as 
being implausible or uncertain in terms of their actual costs and the 
probability of their ever being provided. Harrison and List (2004) 
reach similar conclusions in their comparisons of CV surveys and field 
experiments, and extend the catalogue of distinctions between the two 
methods to differences in sample selection, participant experience and 
heuristics, nature of the commodity being valued (e.g., the availability 
of substitutes for the commodity), and the stakes involved. In the end, 
they argue that experiments and field surveys are meant to be method-
ologically complementary, not substitutes for one another. 
11 Note that this mechanism effectively sets a provision point at zero, 
i.e., if no one makes a positive investment in the public good, then the 
net payout to everyone is zero. See below for more details about the 
investment decision and what is meant by “net payout.” By compari-
son, Ehmke, Lusk, and List (2008) use a provision-point mechanism in 
their experiments. Caplan, Aadland, and Macharia  Estimating Hypothetical Bias in Economically Emergent Africa   347 
 
 
  Third, we designed the experiment to test for 
hypothetical bias in our sample. The existence of 
hypothetical bias indicates that although indi-
viduals may wish to contribute at high levels, 
they understand the inherent coordination prob-
lems and incentives to deviate from the coopera-
tive strategy. Toward this end, half the partici-
pants were given the option of contributing to the 
public good using real money (actual group), 
while the other half simply stated their hypotheti-
cal contribution level (hypothetical group). By 
contrasting the average contribution levels of the 
two groups, we are able to directly test for the 
existence of hypothetical bias. 
  Fourth, in addition to testing for a between-
round learning effect, we provide an information 
treatment where half the participants read through 
an example of the experiment themselves and 
then the researcher quickly re-reads the example 
out loud. Participants were allowed to ask ques-
tions about the experiment at any point in time. 
Also as part of this information treatment, two 
sentences were added to the second-to-last para-
graph of the example: 
What this row of numbers tells us is that the payout is 5 
Pula for a person who chose to invest something and 10 
Pula for a person who chose to invest nothing. Now, 
let’s see how much Pula each of the five people partici-
pating in this example takes home with them from the 
experiment. 
  Participants in the information control group 
read through the example on their own, without 
any additional input provided by the researcher 
and without inclusion of the two sentences 
above.
12 Inclusion of this treatment in our experi-
mental design reflects a pervasive concern about 
“information bias” in the CV literature (Ajzen, 
Brown, and Rosenthal 1996, Smith and Desvous-
ges 1986). 
  To begin the experiment, each participant was 
provided with 50 Pula in cash (approximately 
US$10) with which to make an investment deci-
sion in the public good (the money was paper-
clipped to the experiment’s instruction sheet). 
Participants in the hypothetical treatment were 
reminded that they would “not be paid anything 
more or less,” while participants in the actual 
treatment were informed that they were “invest-
                                                                                    
12 The experimental design presented in the Appendix is for the hypo-
thetical and information treatments. The designs for the other treat-
ments are available from the authors upon request. 
ing for real.” This type of distinction between the 
hypothetical and actual treatments was reiterated 
in the directions for the experiment (see Appendix). 
  As the Payout Chart makes clear, the invest-
ment decision incorporates a free-riding incentive 
and a prisoner’s dilemma (as well as the proper-
ties of non-exclusion and non-rivalry in con-
sumption). The incentive for free-riding occurs 
because, all else equal, those who choose not to 
invest any of their 50 Pula obtain a higher payout 
than those who choose to invest some positive 
amount. A prisoner’s dilemma occurs because 
choosing to invest increases the average group in-
vestment, which in turn leads to a higher payout 
for everyone. 
  As mentioned above, the investment question 
(see Appendix) is presented in a single-bounded 
dichotomous-choice format. In the case of the 
actual treatment (the wording for the hypothetical 
treatment is similar) the investment question reads, 
“This question requires a choice for which your 
net payout from the experiment will ultimately be 
determined.” The bid amounts (used in place of 
“XX”) were randomly and uniformly selected 
from the interval (5, 15, 25, 35, and 45 Pula). 
Based on her response to her specific bid amount, 
the participant’s latent WTP may then be placed 
in one of two regions: (-∞, bid amount) in the 
event of answering “no” to the WTP question, 
and (bid amount, ∞) in the event of answering 
“yes.” 
  After answering the investment question (and 
thus completing round one of the experiment), 
each participant was provided with a Net Payout 
Worksheet. The worksheet enabled a participant 
to calculate her net payout from round one, and 
thus determine the total amount of money remain-
ing if there was going to be only one payout. In 
the process of determining her own net payout, 
the participant also obtained information on the 
average donation of the group, which in turn 
could have conditioned her decision to cooperate 
or not in the next round. 
  Each participant then repeated the experiment 
again in round two, facing the same respective 
bid amount as was randomly drawn in round one. 
By not varying a given participant’s bid amount 
between rounds we ensured that any change in 
her response to the investment question would be 
based solely on any additional information she 
had gained from completing the Net Payout Work-348    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
sheet. In order to mimic typical field-survey con-
ditions, where respondents’ calculations are not 
overseen by the researcher, we purposefully did 
not check the students’ worksheets for any mis-
calculations. Rather, we created two control vari-
ables for our regression analysis based on whether a 
respondent made any mistake(s) on the worksheet.
13 
  Upon completion of round two, a fair coin was 
flipped to determine which of the two rounds 
would determine the participants’ actual net pay-
out. The participants were informed of the coin-
flip procedure prior to beginning round one. The 
reason for randomizing which net payout would 
actually be paid, rather than simply basing the 
payout on round two’s outcome, was to induce 
the students to answer the investment question in 
round one more seriously than they otherwise 
might have. Finally, the students answered a se-
ries of demographic questions (see the Appendix 
for the specific wording of the questions). 
 
Data and Unconditional Tests 
 
The experiment was pre-tested with a group of 30 
graduate students in the University of Botswana 
(UB) Business School. Several changes were made 
to the experimental design as a result of the pre-
test, mostly geared toward fine-tuning the instruc-
tions. During the week following the pre-test, 
approximately 100 undergraduate students from 
the Business School were recruited to participate 
in the experiment.
14 
  The experiment was run in four separate ses-
sions, with approximately 25 students per ses-
sion.
15 Overall summary statistics for each of the 
variables are provided in Table 1. As indicated in 
Table 1, fewer participants answered “yes” to 
their respective bid amounts in round two of the 
experiment than in round one (the mean for Yes1 
is larger than the mean for Yes2). Slightly fewer 
                                                                                    
13 For specifics, refer to the definitions of the smprob and bgprob 
variables included in Table 1 below. 
14 Our sample was restricted to business students for two reasons. 
First, this helped reduce the cost of recruiting students to participate in 
the experiment. Second, it increased the probability that the recruited 
students would understand the investment nature of the experiment. 
See Harrison and List (2004) for an insightful discussion about the 
strengths and weaknesses of using student samples. 
15 The experiment was run on four consecutive days, one session per 
day, to minimize the potential for students to discuss the experiment 
with one another. We initially estimated our empirical model with con-
trols for treatment effects and found them to be insignificant, suggest-
ing the absence of a “session effect.” 
than half of the participants are male, the average 
age is approximately 22 years, and most are Bot-
swana citizens in their junior year or below. Few 
participants classify themselves as being rich in 
income or as having fathered or mothered a child. 
The majority consider themselves as being “happy” 
or “very happy” with their lives. Few participants 
made “small” or “large” mistakes in calculating 
their net payouts from round one of the experi-
ment using the Net Payout Worksheet.
16 
  Table 2 provides an (unconditional) compari-
son of the proportions of participants who an-
swered “yes” to their bid amount in rounds one 
and two of the experiment across the hypothetical 
(hyp = 1) and actual (hyp = 0) treatments. The 
comparison between the hypothetical and actual 
treatments in round one suggests an absence of 
hypothetical bias (either positive or negative), as 
the means for Yes1 (hyp = 0) and Yes1 (hyp = 1) 
are not statistically different from one another at 
the 5 percent significance level. The same com-
parison for round two, however, shows the exis-
tence of positive hypothetical bias since the means 
of Yes2 (hyp = 0) and Yes2 (hyp = 1) are statisti-
cally different from one another. Therefore, we 
find evidence in support of positive hypothetical 
bias in our sample of UB students, but only after 
the participants have completed round one of the 
experiment. 
  The results in Table 2 can also be used to test 
for the effect of information that participants re-
ceived during the experiment.
17 Specifically, the 
mean of Yes1 (hyp = 1) can be compared with the 
mean of Yes2 (hyp = 1) to test for a between-round 
learning effect in the hypothetical treatment, and 
the means of Yes1 (hyp = 0) and Yes2 (hyp = 0) can 
likewise be compared for a between-round learn-
ing effect in the actual treatment. 
  The ratio test suggests that participants in the 
actual treatment responded between rounds by 
reducing their acceptance of the offered bid: the 
mean of Yes2 (hyp = 0) is statistically lower than 
                                                                                    
16 Less than 15 percent of the labor force in Botswana has obtained a 
tertiary education (World Bank 2009). Based on the 2001 Botswana 
Census, nationwide there are slightly more females than males, there 
are slightly more than three children born per woman, and the average 
age is slightly over 36 years (CIA World Factbook 2006). Mean monthly 
income is approximately 3,500 Pula, which is slightly less than US$600 at 
the time of study (World Resources Institute 2009). Thus, by compari-
son, the average individual in our student sample has fewer children 
and is younger and poorer than the national average. 
17 Empirical tests for the effect of information provided prior to the 
experiment are discussed in the next section (see Table 4). Caplan, Aadland, and Macharia  Estimating Hypothetical Bias in Economically Emergent Africa   349 
 
 
Table 1. Variable Names, Definitions, Sample Means and Standard Deviations (N = 102) 
Variable Name  Definition  Mean SD 
Yes1  = 1 if “yes” to bid amount in the first round of the experiment, = 0 otherwise  0.46  0.50 
Yes2  = 1 if “yes” to bid amount in the second round of the experiment, = 0 otherwise  0.38 0.49 
τ  = bid amount (5, 15, 25, 35, or 45 Pula)  24.51  14.10 
hyp  = 1 if experimental session is hypothetical, = 0 otherwise  0.48 0.50 
info  = 1 if additional information about the example was given to participants prior to the 
actual experiment, = 0 otherwise 
0.56 0.50 
male  = 1 if male, = 0 otherwise  0.46 0.50 
age  = years  22.45 3.69 
nation  = 1 if Botswana, = 0 otherwise  0.92 0.27 
class  = 1 if in junior year or below, = 0 otherwise  0.83 0.38 
gpa  = self-reported cumulative grade point average (5.0 highest)  3.36  0.59 
field  = 1 if accounting major, = 0 otherwise (which includes not having declared a major yet 
and double majors) 
0.59 0.49 
rich  = 1 if self-reported income is greater than 3,000 Pula per month, = 0 otherwise  0.14 0.35 
middle  = 1 if self-reported income is between 1,500 and 3,000 Pula per month, = 0 otherwise  0.54 0.50 
risk  = 1 if risk averse, = 0 otherwise  0.42 0.50 
child  = 1 if a mother or father, = 0 if not  0.11 0.31 
happy  = 1 if “happy” or “very happy” with life, = 0 otherwise (including “unsure”)  0.80  0.40 
smprob  = 1 if mistake on net payout worksheet did not preclude correct calculation of net payout, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.09 0.29 
bgprob  = 1 if mistake on net payout worksheet resulted in incorrect calculation of net payout, = 0 
otherwise 
0.21 0.41 
chgwtpup  = 1 if participant marked “no” to investment question in first round and “yes” to 
investment question in second round, = 0 otherwise 
0.08 0.27 
chgwtpdn  = 1 if participant marked “yes” to investment question in first round and “no” to 
investment question in second round, = 0 otherwise 
0.16 0.37 
WTP0  = participant’s ideal (open-ended) bid amount (in Pula)  17.17 13.86 
sense  = 1 if WTP0 was not larger than a bid amount that was rejected in both rounds or the 





the mean of Yes1 (hyp = 0) at the 5 percent level 
of significance. However, participants in the hy-
pothetical treatment did not systematically change 
their responses: the mean of Yes2 (hyp = 1) is not 
statistically different than the mean of Yes1 (hyp = 
1). In other words, it appears that participants in 
the actual treatment learned that cooperation (with-
out coordination) does not pay, but free-riding 
does.
18 
                                                                                    
18 Although not presented in Table 2, we also compared the means for 
prior information effects (i.e., the means for the information and con-
trol groups discussed in the introductory section of this paper). We 
found no evidence that the prior information mattered. 350    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 2. Proportions of Participants Answering “Yes” to the Random Bid (hypothetical vs. actual 
and first-round vs. second-round) 
Treatment Variable  Average 
hyp = 0, round = 1  Yes
a 0.42
a 
hyp = 1, round = 1  Yes
a 0.51 
hyp = 0, round = 2  Yes
b 0.22
a,b 
hyp = 1, round = 2  Yes
b 0.55
b 
a,b Proportions demarcated with superscript a are statistically different from each other at the 5 percent level of significance; 
similarly for proportions demarcated with superscript b. The “across-treatment” test of differences in proportions was carried out 
using Fisher’s exact test. The “within-treatment” test of differences in proportions was carried out using McNemar’s test. 
 
 
  Questions naturally arise as to why only parti-
cipants in the actual treatment were induced to 
free-ride, and why it was necessary for them to 
learn to do so. In answer to the first question, fac-
tors such as consequentiality, credibility, and plau-
sibility (i.e., the degree to which individuals be-
lieve a choice is binding or that their responses 
will affect policy in any meaningful way) seem to 
be the most convincing reasons why only partici-
pants in the actual treatment were induced to free- 
ride (Champ et al. 2002, Cummings and Harrison 
1994, and Carson and Groves 2007). In our par-
ticular case, perhaps participants in the hypotheti-
cal treatment viewed the experiment as being in-
consequential enough to not consider the option 
of investing strategically, while participants in the 
actual treatment not only interpreted their choices 
as being consequential, but also believed the pay-
offs to be plausible, and thus credible. 
  In answer to the second question, experiential 
learning seems to be the primary explanation in 
the experimental literature for delayed free-riding 
behavior (Shogren 2006, Andreoni 1988, An-
dreoni and McGuire 1993, Marwell and Ames 
1981, and Slonim and Roth 1998). For example, 
Andreoni (1988) finds that free-riding is seldom 
observed in one-shot games; however, it is often 
found in finitely repeated games.
19 In the end, it is 
likely that an interaction of the two effects—
consequentiality/plausibility/credibility and learn-
                                                                                    
19 Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) report evidence from their experi-
mental lotteries conducted in China that suggests a role for risk aver-
sion in delaying theoretically predicted responses. Andreoni (1995), 
Houser and Kurzban (2002), and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) suggest 
that confusion on the part of respondents explains the delayed re-
sponse, while Taylor et al. (2001) and Vossler and McKee (2006) find 
evidence against the confusion hypothesis. 
ing—best explains both the extent and timing of 
our free-riding result (Harrison 2006). 
  Non-parametric mean estimates of WTP are 
presented in Table 3. We have calculated these 
estimates using the method proposed by Kriström 
(1990), with linear interpolation to recover the 
empirical survival function, and Ayer et al.’s 
(1955) “pool-adjacent-violator algorithm” to ob-
tain a monotone non-increasing sequence of pro-
portions. The associated standard errors are cal-
culated according to the method proposed by 
Boman, Bostedt, and Kriström (1999). The WTP 
estimates concur with the results presented in 
Table 2. As with the proportion comparisons pre-
sented in Table 2, a comparison of the WTP esti-
mates for round two shows evidence of positive 
hypothetical bias—the respective point estimates 
13.31 Pula and 27.19 Pula are statistically differ-
ent from one another. 
  The WTP estimates also suggest that partici-
pants in the actual treatment responded between 
rounds by reducing their WTP: the point estimate 
of 13.31 Pula is statistically lower than 23.17 
Pula at the 95 percent level of confidence. How-
ever, participants in the hypothetical treatment 
did not lower their WTP: the point estimate of 
27.15 Pula is not statistically different than 27.19 
Pula at standard significance levels. Again, par-





To explain the variation in investment decisions, 
we estimate a bivariate probit model that accounts 
for possible error correlation between the indi-
vidual’s first- and second-round decisions (Greene 
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Table 3. Non-Parametric Estimates of Willingness to Pay (hypothetical vs. actual and first-round 
vs. second-round) 
Treatment  Variable  Mean Estimate (Pula)  Std. Error (Pula) 
hyp = 0, Round = 1  WTP
a 23.17
a 3.27 
hyp = 1, Round = 1  WTP
a 27.15
  3.01 
hyp = 0, Round = 2  WTP
b 13.31
a,b  2.93 
hyp = 1, Round = 2  WTP
b 27.19
b  3.02 
a,b Means demarcated with superscript a are statistically different from each other at the 5 percent level of significance; similarly 
for means demarcated with superscript b. The statistical tests are standard t-tests for differences in means from sub-samples with 
equal sample sizes (for the within-treatment, across-round comparisons) and unequal sample sizes and unequal variances (for the 
across-treatment, within-round comparisons). See Hogg and Craig (1978) for the methods used to conduct these tests. The WTP 






,, , ij ij j ij YX =β + ∈ , 
 
where i indexes participants; j = 1,2 denotes the 
round of the experiment; X i,j is a vector of ex-
planatory variables from Table 1 including the 
hyp treatment effect and bid τi; βj is a vector of 
the associated coefficients; and the errors ∈i,j are 
assumed to have a bivariate standard normal dis-
tribution with correlation parameter ρ. If the la-
tent dependent variable 
*
, ij Y  is greater than zero, 
then the participant invests τi (Yesi,j = 1). If the 
latent dependent variable 
*
, ij Y  is less than or equal 
to zero, then the participant does not make the 
investment (Yesi,j = 0). Each participant can there-
fore be placed in one of four investment catego-
ries: (Yesi,1 = 0, Yesi,2 = 0), (Yesi,1 = 1, Yesi,2 = 0), 
(Yesi,1 = 0, Yesi,2 = 1), or (Yesi,1 = 1, Yesi,2 = 1). 
The probabilities of being in the four investment 
categories are then used to form and maximize 
the joint log likelihood function. 
Results 
 
Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates and 
bootstrapped standard errors from the maximum 
likelihood estimation.
20 We find evidence that the 
round-one and round-two error terms are posi-
tively correlated (i.e., ρ is positive and statisti-
                                                                                    
20 GAUSS version 8.0 is used to estimate the model. We estimate the 
model with both the full and a reduced set of variables included in 
Table 1. Since several of the variables were insignificant in those re-
gressions, we dropped the demographic variables from the models pre-
sented in Table 4. We also used ordinary least squares to estimate a 
model where WTP0 was the regressand, but found that few of the vari-
ables could explain variation in the open-ended measure of WTP. 
cally significant at the 1 percent level), suggesting 
that the bivariate model is preferred over a uni-
variate model. For round one, only the coefficient 
estimate for bid τ is statistically significant (at the 
10 percent level), implying inter alia the absence 
of hypothetical bias and no effect of prior infor-
mation (info) in round one of the experiment—a 
result that concurs with the unconditional com-
parisons and WTP estimates shown in Tables 2 
and 3, and discussed in the previous section.
21 
  However, the story is different for round two. 
The coefficients for info and hyp are both statisti-
cally significant (at the 10 percent and 1 percent 
levels, respectively). Individuals in the hypotheti-
cal treatment are more likely to accept the bid 
than those facing an actual decision of whether to 
contribute to the public good. In other words, we 
find evidence of positive hypothetical bias in 
round two of the experiment—again a result that 
is consistent with the unconditional comparisons 
and WTP estimates shown in Tables 2 and 3. We 
also find that, on average, additional information 
provided prior to round one of the experiment 
helps reduce the individual’s probability of ac-
cepting the bid, but the effect is weaker than for 
hypothetical bias both in terms of its magnitude 
and statistical significance. 
  To further investigate the effect of prior infor-
mation on the probability of accepting the bid, we 
                                                                                    
21 We also estimated a regression of WTP0 on τ to check for anchor-
ing bias. The coefficient on τ was positive and statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level, suggesting the existence of anchoring bias in 
our sample. However, without any variation in τ across rounds of the 
experiment, we are unable to identify this effect in the dichotomous-
choice framework. 352    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 4. Bivariate Probit Estimates for Rounds One and Two 
Variable  Coefficient (Round 1)  Coefficient (Round 2) 
















ρ  0.7741*** 
(0.0979) 
Log L  -115.0383 
Sample Size  102 
 
TESTS FOR PRIOR INFORMATION EFFECTS ACROSS TREATMENTS 
Treatment  Null Hypothesis  Wald Statistic
a  P-Value 
hyp = 1, round = 1  inf1 inf 0 β= β  0.98 0.32 
hyp = 1, round = 2  inf1 inf 0 β= β  0.04 0.85 
hyp = 0, round = 1  inf1 inf 0 β= β  0.98 0.32 
hyp = 0, round = 2  inf1 inf 0 β= β  2.73* 0.10 
a  Calculated for one linear restriction per hypothesis with sample size 102. 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Bootstrapped standard er-
rors are in parentheses. 
 
 
created four separate interactive dummy variables 
(info × hyp) for each round. We then re-estimated 
the model with only these new variables and the 
bid. Wald tests were performed to test for prior 
information effects across treatments. The bottom 
half of Table 4 presents our results. As indicated, 
prior information had only a slight statistical ef-
fect (10 percent level of significance) in the sec-
ond round on participants in the actual treatment. 
Accordingly, participants in the actual treatment 
who had been provided with prior information 
were less likely to accept their bids than those 
who had not.
22 
  In addition to the bivariate model, we also esti-
mated two separate univariate probit models to 
check for between-round learning effects for the 
                                                                                    
22 The regression results for this test are available upon request from 
the authors. 
hypothetical and actual treatments. The results are 
presented in Table 5. In the first model, we in-
vestigate the behavior of individuals who an-
swered “yes” to the initial investment decision 
(N= 47). The dependent variable measures whether 
these individuals switched from investing a posi-
tive amount in round one of the experiment to 
investing nothing in round two (i.e., chgwtpdn = 
1). The coefficient estimate for hyp is negative 
and significant at the 1 percent level of signifi-
cance. This suggests that individuals making ac-
tual investment decisions were more likely to 
switch from having said “yes” in round one to 
saying “no” in round two. Similar to our uncon-
ditional results in our “Data and Unconditional 
Tests” section and the results for prior informa-
tion discussed above, we find evidence that indi-
viduals in the actual treatment learned that coop-
eration does not pay but that free-riding does. Caplan, Aadland, and Macharia  Estimating Hypothetical Bias in Economically Emergent Africa   353 
 
 
Table 5. Univariate Probit Estimation Sorted by Initial Investment Decision 
MODEL 1: “Yes” to Initial Investment 
Dependent Variable = chgwtpdn 
MODEL 2: “No” to Initial Investment 
Dependent Variable = chgwtpup 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient Coefficient 
















Log L  -22.5976  -21.6425 
Sample Size  47
  55
 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
The sample sizes depend on how a respondent answered the investment question in the first round of the experiment. As such, 47 
of the 102 participants responded “yes” to their bid value in round 1, and 55 participants responded “no.” 
 
 
  In the second model, we investigate the behav-
ior of individuals who answered “no” to the ini-
tial investment decision (N = 52). Here the de-
pendent variable measures whether individuals 
switched from investing nothing in round one of 
the experiment to investing a positive amount in 
round two (i.e., chgwtpup = 1). The coefficient on 
hyp is positive but not statistically different than 
zero. This indicates that individuals who invested 
hypothetically were no more likely to increase 
their investment between rounds than those who 
made actual investment decisions. Therefore, we 
find no evidence that individuals in the hypotheti-
cal treatment learned to cooperate any more than 
those in the actual treatment. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper reports evidence of positive hypotheti-
cal bias in a CV-based public good experiment 
conducted with university students in the African 
nation of Botswana. To our knowledge, this is the 
first such evidence of positive hypothetical bias 
for an African country—the only previous public 
good experiment, conducted with students in the 
country of Niger, reports evidence of negative 
hypothetical bias. 
  The fact that positive hypothetical bias is found 
through our regression analysis only in the sec-
ond round of the experiment—after participants 
have used a worksheet to calculate their respec-
tive net payouts from round one—suggests that 
additional information provided during (i.e., be-
tween rounds of) the experiment may be an ef-
fective method to induce participants making ac-
tual investment decisions to reduce their WTP for 
the public good. However, additional between-
round information does not eliminate positive 
hypothetical bias in the sense that it does not in-
duce participants who are investing hypotheti-
cally to similarly reduce their WTP. 
  The finding that additional information pro-
vided during the experiment induces only those 
participants who are making an actual investment 
to reduce their WTP for the public good suggests 
that mitigating hypothetical bias in CV-based 
research may require additional mitigation meas-
ures, such as ex ante reminder statements (see 
Cummings and Taylor 1999, List 2001, Aadland 
and Caplan 2006) and ex post calibration of WTP 
(List and Shogren 1998, Harrison et al. 1999). 
With respect to real-payment situations, such as 
those encountered by charitable organizations, 
our results suggest that the prior experiences of 
potential donors are likely to matter. All else 
equal, those having been solicited more often in 
the past may be more likely to free-ride on the 
expected contributions of others. Thus, provision-354    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
point mechanisms, where minimum aggregate con-
tribution thresholds are pre-established, are likely 
to be necessary in obtaining incentive-compatible 
pledges of support. 
  Our findings should be judged with two cave-
ats in mind. First, the sample for the experiment 
is confined to university business students. There-
fore, while it may be representative of that par-
ticular subgroup of students, our sample may not 
be representative of the university student body at 
large; it certainly is not representative of the Bot-
swana population in general (see footnote 16). 
Second, Botswana is generally considered to be 
an economically emergent country, in the sense 
that its economic growth since independence in 
1966 has been both steady and high relative to the 
vast majority of the world’s other developing 
countries (World Bank Group 2000). Thus, gen-
eralizing this paper’s results to the rest of Africa, 
let alone the lesser-developed world at large, is of 
questionable value. 
  As a result of these caveats, the role for future 
research is clear. More public good experiments 
need to be conducted in Africa and other lesser-
developed areas of the world, preferably with 
larger and more representative samples. Ideally, a 
variety of public good mechanisms, such as pro-
vision and non-provision points, will be tested in 
the laboratory. As in the more-developed world, 
results from a broad base of experimental re-
search will then help guide the design of survey 
instruments for field research throughout the les-
ser-developed world. Indeed, the current pace at 
which markets and non-markets (e.g., global ex-
ternalities) are becoming linked internationally 
compels us to understand how welfare is deter-
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You have been given 50 Pula to participate in this 
experiment. The money is yours to keep. You will 
not be paid anything more or less. 
  Before the actual experiment begins, a simple 
example is presented. The purpose of the example 
is to demonstrate how an individual’s “net pay-
out” from the experiment is determined. Net pay-
out is an amount of money that an individual re-
ceives based on (i) how much of his own money 
he chooses to invest, and (ii) how much money 
everyone else in the room chooses to invest. The 
actual experiment that you and the other students 
in this room are going to participate in will begin 
after you have gone through this example. 
 
EXAMPLE 
Suppose there are only five individuals in a room, 
each of whom has been given 20 Pula. After study-
ing the Payout Chart below, the individuals make 
the following decisions: 
 
  Individual 1 chooses to invest nothing. 
  Individual 2 chooses to invest 5 Pula. 
  Individual 3 chooses to invest 10 Pula. 
  Individuals 4 and 5 each choose to invest 15 Pula. 
 
These choices result in a total of 45 Pula invested 
from the five individuals, for an average invest-
ment of 45 Pula ÷ 5 individuals = 9 Pula. Based 
on the Payout Chart below, we can now calculate 
each individual’s net payout.  
 
Payout Chart – This is only an example 
 Payout  Ranges 
  “Yes, I’ll 
invest” 
“No, I won’t 
invest” 
Average Group Investment  Payout (Pula) 
Payout 
(Pula) 
Greater than 0 Pula; 
less than or equal 
to 10 Pula 
  5  10 
Greater than 10 Pula; 
less than or equal 
to 20 Pula 
20 25 
 
  Begin by noting that for this example the aver-
age group investment of 9 Pula is between 0 Pula 
and 10 Pula in the Payout Chart, so we can focus 
on the first row of numbers. What this row of 
numbers tells us is that the payout is 5 Pula for a 
person who chose to invest something and 10 
Pula for a person who chose to invest nothing. 
Now, let’s see how much Pula each of the five Caplan, Aadland, and Macharia  Estimating Hypothetical Bias in Economically Emergent Africa   357 
 
 
people participating in this example take home 
with them from the experiment. 
  Individual 1 chose to invest nothing. He there-
fore receives a net payout of 10 Pula (10 Pula 
payout from the Payout Chart above less 0 Pula 
invested) and he leaves the room with a total of 
30 Pula (the 20 Pula he started the experiment 
with plus his 10 Pula net payout). Individual 2 
chose to invest 5 Pula. She therefore receives a 
net payout of 0 Pula (5 Pula payout from the Pay-
out Chart above less 5 Pula invested) and she 
leaves the room with a total of 20 Pula. Individual 
3 chose to invest 10 Pula. He therefore receives a 
net payout of -5 Pula (5 Pula payout from the 
Payout Chart above less 10 Pula invested) and he 
leaves the room with a total of 15 Pula. Individu-
als 4 and 5 each chose to invest 15 Pula. They 
therefore each receive a net payout of -10 Pula (5 
Pula payout from the Payout Chart above less 15 
Pula invested) and each leaves the room with 10 
Pula. 




Directions. Use the payout chart below to decide 
whether to hypothetically invest some or none of 
your 50 Pula. If this experiment were for real, 
your actual net payout would be determined by 
your own investment choice and the average in-
vestment of the group, as was demonstrated in the 
example. Note that if the total group investment is 
zero (and thus the average group investment is 







“No, I won’t 
invest” 





Greater than 0 Pula; 
less than or equal to 10 Pula  5 10 
Greater than 10 Pula;  
less than or equal to 20 Pula  20 25 
Greater than 20 Pula;  
less than or equal to 30 Pula  35 40 
Greater than 30 Pula;  
less than or equal to 40 Pula  50 55 
Greater than 40 Pula;  
less than or equal to 45 Pula  65 70 
Greater than 45 Pula;  
less than or equal to 50 Pula  80 85 
 
INVESTMENT QUESTION   
This question requires a choice for which your net payout 
from the experiment would be hypothetically determined. 
Are you willing to make an investment of XX Pula? 
  Yes  ” 




NET PAYOUT WORKSHEET 
 
1. Amount of Pula I was asked to invest: _____ 
  This is the Pula amount that was included in the Investment 
Question during the experiment. 
 
2. Amount of Pula that I agreed to invest: _____ 
  If you decided to check the “Yes” box for the Investment 
Question during the experiment, then re-enter the number 
that you have written on line 1 above onto line 2. If you 
checked the “No” box for the Investment Question, then en-
ter 0 on line 2. 
 
3. My payout from the experiment: _____ 
  This is the number that has been worked out on the board in 
front of the class and that corresponds to the amount of Pula 
that you agreed to invest. 
 
4. My net payout from the experiment: _____ 
  Subtract the amount you have written on line 2 from the 
amount on line 3. Note that this could be a negative num-
ber. 
 
5. The amount of money I leave the experiment 
with: ______ 




Please answer the following questions to the best 
of your ability. These questions are very impor-
tant to us. Remember that all information is com-
pletely anonymous and confidential. 
 
1. Gender: 
  ”  Male      ”  Female 
 
2. Age:  ______. 
 
3. Nationality/ethnicity: ______________. 358    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
4. Class  Standing: 
  ” First  year 
  ” Second  year 
  ” Third  year 
  ” Fourth  year 
  ” Graduate 
 
5.  Cumulative grade point average: _________ 
 
6.  Have you declared a major field of study? 
  ”  Yes       ”  No 
  If yes, what is your major field of study?  ___ 
 
7. In which range do you think your monthly 
consumption expenditure currently falls [con-
sumption expenditure includes money that you 
spend (and that other people spend to support 
you) for things like food, clothing, housing, 
entertainment, cell phone, utility bills, savings at 
the bank, etc.—it does not include money that 
you give or lend to other people]? 
  ”  Less than 1,500 Pula per month. 
  ”  Greater than 1,500 Pula but less than 3,000 Pula per 
month. 
  ”  Greater than 3,000 Pula but less than 4,500 Pula per 
month. 
  ”  Greater than 4,500 Pula but less than 6,000 Pula per 
month. 
  ”  Greater than 6,000 Pula per month. 
 
8.  Which would you choose?  
  ”  50 Pula with certainty. 
  ”  50% chance of 0 Pula; 50% chance of 100 Pula. 
  ”  I’m indifferent between the two choices above.   
 
9.  Do you have a son or a daughter? 
  ”  Yes       ”   No 
 
10. Please check the box that best describes your 
current level of happiness in life. 
  ”  I am very unhappy with my life. 
  ”  I am unhappy with my life. 
  ”  I am happy with my life. 
  ”  I am very happy with my life. 
  ”  I am uncertain about my happiness in life. 
 
11. If you could have chosen an amount yourself 
to invest in the experiment that you have just 
participated in, what would that amount have 
been (taken from your 50 Pula)? ________ 
 








   
 